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THE MENTALLY ILL HOMELESS: EVOLVING
INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT ISSUES
THE HONORABLE EDMUND V. LUDWIG*
TN the early 1970s, often worn on a large lapel button, there was
a sick joke-"Be for mental health or I'll kill you"-that
summed up a number of popular and simplistic attitudes toward a
complex and deplorable problem.' It also presaged the phenom-
enal increase in homeless persons, many of whom are thought to
be mentally ill.2
A commitment case that arose in New York City in 1987 illus-
trates difficult current issues involving the mentally ill homeless.3
The homeless person was Joyce Brown, also known as "Billie
Boggs." 4 On October 28, 1987, members of the city's Homeless
* United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Based on a paper presented by Judge Ludwig at Villanova Law School Sympo-
sium on The Homeless on November 3, 1990.
1. See Parry, Civil Commitment: Three Proposals for Change, 10 MENTAL & PHYSI-
CAL DISABILITY L. REP. 334, 334 (1986).
Historically, the public civil commitment debate was more crude
than sophisticated, often pitting friends, relatives and neighbors against
state and local governments. The views of the mentally disabled per-
son were at best secondary considerations. [Their] options . . .were
usually limited to all or nothing types of choices: remain in the home
without government assistance or interference; or ostracized to an un-
known fate; or be committed to some awful institution.
Id.
2. National Coalition for the Homeless, A Briefing Paper for Presidential Candi-
dates: Homelessness In the United States - Background and Federal Response, in THE
RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS 122-24 (July 1, 1987) (Practicing Law Institute Litiga-
tion Course Handbook Series No. 331) [hereinafter Briefing Paper] ("Homeless-
ness in America has reached epidemic proportions .... An estimated two to
three million ... are now homeless."). Approximately one-third of the Nation's
homeless are believed to be seriously mentally ill. For a discussion of mental
illness and homelessness, see infra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
3. In re Boggs, 136 Misc. 2d 1082, 522 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct.), ret 'd sub
nom. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523
N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), appeal dismissed as moot, 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525
N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
4. Id. at 1083, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 408. The appellate division majority opinion
refers to her as follows: "Ms. Billie Boggs (Ms. Boggs) is a forty year old wo-
man, whose real name is Ms. Joyce Brown. She chooses to use the name Ms.
Billie Boggs, since she admires a television personality of that name, and she
desires to thwart her family's efforts to locate her." Boggs v. New York City Health
& Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d at 343, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 72; see also Forcibly Hospitalized
Woman Identified, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1987, at BI, col. 1 (article also describes
Ms. Boggs' situation and choice of name).
(1085)
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Emergency Liaison Project (Project HELP) removed her from the
street and placed her in a psychiatric unit at Bellevue Hospital
where she was given anti-psychotic medication.5 After placing
much emphasis on Brown's behavior, demeanor and testimony,
the trial judge ordered her release, finding that she was not men-
tally ill or unable to care for herself.6 On appeal, the appellate
division reversed, three to two, holding that she was involuntarily
committable. 7 The dissenters agreed that she was mentally ill but
did not believe there was a likelihood of serious self-harm. 8
These three opinions, the trial court's decision and the appellate
division's majority and dissent, differed considerably in their legal
and attitudinal approaches to committability. Each opinion con-
tains important implications for the involuntary commitment of
the mentally ill homeless. They are best understood when pro-
jected against the historical background of the incidence and
composition of mentally ill persons among the homeless and the
developments over the years in the field of mental health law.
I. DEINSTITUTIONALIZATION: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF THE
MENTALLY ILL HOMELESS
Although perhaps not based on scientific data, it is generally
believed that deinstitutionalization of the chronically mentally ill
without providing sufficient community services has been respon-
sible for a significant segment of the homeless. 9 The figures usu-
ally given are in the range of twenty-five to thirty-five percent.' 0
5. In re Boggs, 136 Misc. 2d at 1084, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
6. Id. at 1086-91, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 410-12. For a discussion of the diagnoses
of the psychiatrists, see infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
7. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.2d at 366, 523
N.Y.S.2d at 87.
8. Id. (Minolas, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the record showed
no evidence of "any violence directed at [Ms. Boggs] or any emanating from
her," and that all of her hospital evaluations concluded that she was not a dan-
ger to herself or others. Id. at 378-79, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 94-95 (Minolas, J.,
dissenting).
9. See Homelessness in America: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 24, 119, 126 (1987) (statements of Sen. Cranston and Harvey Vieth, U.S.
Dept. of Health and Human Services, Chairman, Federal Interagency Task
Force on Food and Shelter).
10. See Hunger and Homelessness: Hearing Before the Select Comm. on Hunger of the
House of Representatives, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1987). Even writers, such as
Professor Kanter, who contend that deinstitutionalization is not a major contrib-
utor to the increase in homeless people, agree that homelessness and mental
illness can interact. Kanter, Homeless But Not Helpless: Legal Issues in the Case of the
Homeless People With Mental Illness, 45J. Soc. IssuEs 91 (No. 3 1989). They con-
cede that unresolved severe psychiatric problems may result in homelessness
1086 [Vol. 36: p. 1085
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In 1984, the authoritative Lamb American Psychiatric Association
Task Force estimated that thirty-five percent of the homeless pop-
ulation became homeless, as a result of deinstitutionalization and
that an additional fifteen percent of the homeless had mental
health problems."l In 1991, a study showed a sharp rise in drug-
addicted homeless.12 Sometimes, these assessments may seem to
be in the eye of the political beholder. Also published in 1984, a
study by the City of New York claimed that ninety percent of the
homeless were mentally ill, while New York State reported only
ten percent.' 3 The State is responsible for the care of the men-
tally disabled and the city for poor persons, such as the homeless,
who are not mentally ill. 14
Definitions of mental illness play a large part in all of the esti-
mates, and the timing of the assessment of a person may be criti-
cal.' 5 It is well recognized that homelessness, like incarceration,
can have a profoundly decompensating effect. 16 Some clinicians
say it can mimic severe mental illness in those who have no his-
tory of problems. Others claim that most persons in this category
are already vulnerable to stress. Although subject to many of the
same socioeconomic factors that produce homeless families, the
and, conversely, homelessness may provoke or exacerbate symptoms of mental
illness. Id. These writers take the position that as many as 20% of the general
population will at some time have serious mental problems. For the seriously
mentally ill in the general population, most studies suggest a range from five to
eight percent.
11. THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION (C.H. Lamb ed. 1984) [hereinafter HOMELESS MEN-
TALLY ILL]. As the Report documents, much of these computations depend on
the definitions of mental illness and the methodologies utilized. Id. at 88.
12. The Changing Face of Street Population, Phila. Inquirer, Feb. 5, 1991, at B2,
col. 3 (reporting on Outreach Coordination Center figures for 1988-90).
13. See Coates, Legal Rights of Homeless Americans, 24 U.S.F. L. REV. 297, 330
& n.174 (1990).
14. Id. "[T]he City is responsible for those Homeless who are merely eco-
nomically deprived, and specifically not for the mentally ill Homeless." Id.
15. See supra note 11; see also In re Boggs, 136 Misc. 2d 1082, 1088, 522
N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd sub nom. Boggs v. New York City Health &
Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d (1987), appeal dismissed as moot, 70
N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988). "[A hospital psychia-
trist] testified that those few intervening days at the hospital provided Ms.
Brown with a structured environment which permitted her to 'reconstitute her-
self' by the time the NYCLU doctors saw her." Id.
16. Comment, Homeless Families: Do They Have a Right to Integrity? 35 UCLA
L. REV. 159, 164 (1987). "Research shows that homelessness disrupts an indi-
vidual's emotional well-being, causing confusion and cognitive dissonance.
Once this disorientation occurs, others, including other homeless persons who
still maintain a resemblance of mental health, shun the individual, thereby lead-
ing to further disorientation." Id. (footnotes omitted).
1991] 1087
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mentally ill have been loners who favor single-room accommoda-
tions and who are functionally unable to take care of their basic
needs. 17
Deinstitutionalization began in the 1950s with the discovery
that Thorazine, which was then being used experimentally to ease
the pain of post-operative patients, could organize the minds of
certain long-term schizophrenics. 18 There is the perhaps apocry-
phal story of the World War I veteran who, having been institu-
tionalized and disoriented for some thirty-five years, went up to a
hospital psychiatrist and said, "Hey, Doc, what am I doing
here?"' 19 Many of the transformations were unbelievable and
seemingly miraculous. Previously "hopeless" patients could be
given the chance to live in the community. Some had spent their
entire adult lives in the back wards of a state or veterans adminis-
tration hospital. Many kinds of anti-psychotic or psychotropic
medication were formulated, and each year, new drugs continued
to be approved.20 In 1990, clozapine became available in the
United States. 2 ' A so-called new generation of pharmacotherapy,
clozapine may enable the release, of as many as thirty percent of
long-term patients still in state hospitals and improve the lives of
a substantial number of those who remain there.
Before anti-psychotic medication came into use, long-term
hospitalization often was the rule. A mentally ill person could
spend a lifetime in custodial care, particularly when also confined
on criminal matters.22 In 1960, the state hospital census in
17. See Comment, supra note 16, at 163 ("Although the causes ... differ,
they share the basic trauma of lack of shelter."); Ades, The Unconstitutionality of
'Antihomeless'Laws, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 601 (1989) ("The stereotype of... an
older alcoholic male has lost most of its validity ....").
18. See HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL, supra note 11, at 229-30; see also Sobel,
Psychiatric Drugs Widely Misused, Critics Charge, N.Y. Times, June 3, 1980, at Cl,
col. 5. For a discussion of the view that deinstitutionalization pre-dated anti-
psychotic medications, see A. SCULL, DECARCERATION, COMMUNITY TREATMENT
AND THE DEVIANT-A RADICAL VIEW (1984).
19. J. SWAZEY, CHROPROMAZINE IN PSYCHIATRY, 200-01 (1974) ("The most
memorable experience [was] ... this small group of patients in the day room...
with their psychiatric symptoms wiped away.").
20. See Durham & La Fond, A Search for the Missing Premise of Involuntary Ther-
apeutic Commitment: Effective Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 303,
343 (1988) ("Since 1960, it is estimated that well over 25,000 papers have been
published in the scientific literature on the effectiveness of psychotropic
drugs.").
21. See Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990) (requiring
Kansas' Medicaid program to include clozapine, under brand name Clozaril, in
its list of covered drugs).
22. Farview State Hospital, Pennsylvania's maximum security hospital, is a
striking example. In 1979, a group of forensic mental health experts were in-
1088 [Vol. 36: p. 1085
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America was somewhere between 500,000 and one million- the
data is that imprecise. 23 By the 1980s, the number was closer to
100,000, and it continues to decline, though less dramatically.24
Who were these long-term patients and what happened to them?
In most cases, their family ties were attenuated or severed. They
received no ongoing treatment, and their hospitalizations were
custodial. In many instances, these people were institutionalized
because their families could not or would not take care of them.
As anti-psychotic medication gained widespread acceptance,
civil commitment laws were being revised. The commitment
standard had been simply "mental illness" plus the need for care
and custody or, sometimes, just care.25 In 1975, the United
States Supreme Court decision in O'Connor v. Donaldson 2 6 notified
the states that they could not involuntarily confine a non-danger-
ous mentally ill person, without more, who was capable of surviv-
ing with the help of willing family members or friends.2 7 If a state
vited to assess the appropriateness of Farview's population, many of whom had
been committed as incompetent to stand trial. Case Review and Clinical Semi-
nar on the Least Restrictive Alternative, Conducted by the Office of Mental
Health, Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (May 30-31, 1979) [herein-
after Office of Mental Health Seminar) (program held at Fairview State Hospital
and attended by author). One of the residents was 80 years old and, according
to his faded longhand admission note, had been charged with the crime of bug-
gery and committed to Farview in 1921. He was never tried. Id. In the early
1970s, following Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), and Jackson v. Indi-
ana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), he was offered re-location to a community home,
which he refused. Office of Mental Health Seminar. As of 1979, the Common-
wealth was spending about $75,000 a year for his "hospitalization." Id.
23. See, e.g., Coates, supra note 13, at 331 ("perhaps one million"); M.
CuoMo, NEVER AGAIN, A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S ASSOCIATION
TASK FORCE ON THE HOMELESS, H.R. Doc. No. 43-749 0-85-13, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 41 (1983) (from 1963 to 1979, in-patient population of psychiatric institu-
tions decreased from 505,000 to approximately 146,000); Durham & La Fond,
supra note 20, at 306 n.9.
24. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL INST. OF
MENTAL HEALTH, MENTAL HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES, Tables 2.3 & 2.8
(1985).
25. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of
1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4406(b) (Purdon 1969) (repealed in part 1976)
("If, upon examination, it is determined that such [mentally disabled] person is
in need of care at a facility.., said court... may order the commitment of such
person for care and treatment."); Goldy v. Beal, 429 F. Supp. 640, 648 (M.D. Pa.
1976) (§ 4406 civil commitment standard violates due process because "in need
of care" and "care" are impermissibly vague).
26. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
27. Id. at 576. The Supreme Court further found that a state may not con-
fine the mentally ill to provide them with a higher standard of living or to protect
the state's citizens from exposure to such persons. Id. at 575. The Court stated
that "[m]ere public intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the
deprivation of a person's physical liberty." Id.
1991] 1089
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did so, it could be held liable for damages. 28 At least equally sig-
nificant, the decision vacated the holding of a circuit court that an
involuntary committee has a constitutional right to treatment. 29
The Donaldson decision also left open whether an involuntary
commitment for the sole purpose of treatment could be constitu-
tionally acceptable.3 0 Seventeen years later, these questions re-
main undecided.
The revised commitment laws required a showing of clear
and present danger to oneself or others, although the rubrics of
the standard, such as "severely mentally disabled," "gravely dis-
abled," "imminent threat," and the particular definitions varied
from statute to statute. 3' In all of these new laws, counseled hear-
ings, time-limited commitments, and periodic administrative and
judicial reviews were mandated. 32 These statutory limitations,
once in place, also served to shrink the state hospital populations.
In 1976, after Pennsylvania's new commitment law went into
effect, the state's Office of Mental Health was informed that of the
5,500 long-term "voluntary patients" in the state hospitals, some
3,800 were unable to understand and sign the new voluntary ad-
mission forms. 33 What was to be done? How did they become
28. Id.
29. Id. at 577 n.12. ("Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of
the Court of Appeals [of the Fifth Circuit] deprives that court's opinion of prece-
dential effect, leaving this Court's opinion and judgment as the sole law of the
case."). Id. at 578.
30. Id. at 574 n.10. The Donaldson Court noted:
There is ... no occasion in this case to decide whether the provision of
treatment, standing alone, can ever constitutionally justify involuntary
confinement or, if it can, how much or what kind of treatment would
suffice for that purpose. In its present posture this case involves not
involuntary treatment but simply involuntary custodial confinement.
Id.
31. See Note, "Crazy" Until Proven Innocent? Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill
Homeless, 19 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 333-42 (1988). For example, "[tihe New
York Mental Hygiene Law authorizes emergency detention of individuals who
have mental illnesses which are 'likely to result in serious harm' to themselves or
others and which demand immediate observation, care, and treatment in a hos-
pital." Id. at 338.
32. See B. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW, 164-65 (1971).
These procedural safeguards serve to protect the rights of the mentally ill who
are involuntarily hospitalized. Id. at 155.
33. Information obtained from the Office of Mental Health, Pennsylvania
Department of Welfare. See Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act of
1976, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7203 (Purdon Supp. 1991). Under this statute,
voluntary commitment requires informed consent. Id. The statute provides that
"[b]efore a person is accepted... an explanation shall be made.., including the
types of treatment . . . and any restraints or restrictions . . . together with a
statement of ... rights under this act." Id. A detailed, executed consent form
must also be submitted. Id.
1090 [Vol. 36: p. 1085
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hospitalized in the first place? Years ago, "voluntary" could
mean "not objecting." 34 If a patient could not qualify as volun-
tary any longer, the only alternative was involuntary. That meant
.conducting an administrative review every thirty days and coun-
seled hearings every ninety days, assuming that the revised com-
mitment standard could be met.3 5 If it could not be, the patient
had to be released.
Other deinstitutionalization forces were also at work. In the
late 1970s, a period of escalating, double-digit inflation, the dis-
charge of long-term patients was welcome news for state budget
and welfare officials. In turn, the curtailment of public funding
that began during this time period may have had a greater deinsti-
tutionalizing effect than all the successes of the civil rights move-
ment. For the time-being, these synergistic bedfellows
accelerated the rate of deinstitutionalization. In 1976, the new
commitment act in Pennsylvania was intended to be a prompt ser-
vice law, not a deinstitutionalization law. 36 But its array of due
process requirements favored short-term treatment- the longer
the commitment period, the more difficult the retention proce-
dures. The necessary corollary was to compel the Common-
wealth to consider other dispositions for many of its long-term
patients. As in most areas of the country, the service package
promised by the Pennsylvania Department of Welfare to accom-
pany the new procedures law did not materialize. The federal
Mental Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health
Centers Construction Act of 196337 envisioned a nationwide net-
work of community centers providing comprehensive services
34. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of
1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4404 (Purdon 1969) (repealed in part 1976) (ap-
plication for civil commitment to facility "(a) may be made in the interest of any
person who appears to be mentally disabled and in need of care . . .
(b) accompanied by the certificates of two physicians"). This "non-involuntary"
provision was invalidated a few years after enactment. Dixon v. Attorney Gen.,
325 F. Supp. 966, 973 (M.D. Pa. 1971) (court found § 4404 unconstitutional
facially and as applied to plaintiffs). The decision in Dixon resulted in the release
of more than 1,000 maximum security residents of Farview State Hospital who
had been committed after the authority for their criminal confinement had ex-
pired. Office of Mental Health Seminar, supra note 22. For a discussion of the
appropriateness of Farview's population, see supra note 22.
35. See Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, §§ 7108, 7304(e)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1991) (by amendment in 1978, re-
commitment periods were increased up to 180 days).
36. Id. § 7102 (Purdon Supp. 1991) ("It is the policy of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania to seek to assure the availability of adequate treatment to per-
sons who are mentally ill, and it is the purpose of this act to establish procedures
whereby this policy can be effected.").
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (1988).
1991] 1091
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and individual case management.38 Of the 2,500 centers contem-
plated by the Act, fewer than 700 were built.3 9
Although the cuts in state hospital allocations may have
seemed harsh at the time, the consequences for community pro-
gram funding were even worse.40 In Pennsylvania, even after
community mental health units were established under the
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966,4' the state
hospital budget continued to receive three-fourths of the state's
mental health dollars. 42 However, by comparison, the numbers
of persons served in each system were more than inversely pro-
portional.43 Traditionally, the state hospitals were political
fiefdoms. Shutting down a state hospital was not much different
from trying to close a military base or a naval shipyard. Even to-
day, when the state hospital census in Pennsylvania is about
7,000, down from a high of 65,000 in the 1950s, the preponder-
ance of state money available for mental health services goes to
the hospitals. 44
It is not surprising that eighty-five to ninety percent of long-
term state hospital patients have been indigent.45 By the time of
admission, these patients have exhausted or been stripped of
38. Id.
39. Note, Requiring Due Care in the Process of Patient Deinstitutionalization: To-
ward a Common Law Approach to Mental Health Care Reform, 98 YALE L.J. 1153, 1156
(1989); Kanter, supra note 10, at 98.
40. Coates, supra note 13, at 331 ("In California, for example, the allocation
for mental health care is less than one fourth the money that was being allocated
twenty-five years ago.").
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 4404 (Purdon 1969) (repealed in part 1976).
42. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, Summary of Fiscal Activity
(fiscal years 1966-1980) (spreadsheet including Overview of Governor's Recom-
mended Budget 1981-1991) (document on file at Villanova Law Review office).
43. Id. In 1966-67, the year-end state hospital census in Pennsylvania was
33,207. Id. By 1975-1976, it had dropped to 13,293. Id.; see Note, supra note 39,
at 1156 n.21 ("State hospitals receive more than twice the funds allocated to
[Community Mental Health Services] .... In 1965, New York State had 85,000
in state psychiatric facilities, but in 1979 it had only 25,000. At both times 80%
of state funds were allocated to state psychiatric facilities as opposed to commu-
nity alternatives.").
44. Memorandum entitled "Public Health System Historical Information,"
from Jack A. Wolford, M.D., Psychiatric Director, Office of Mental Health, Penn-
sylvania Department of Public Welfare (October 4, 1991) (document on file at
Villanova Law Review office).
45. Durham & La Fond, "Thank you, Dr. Stone": A Response to Dr. Alan Stone
and Some Further Thoughts on the Wisdom of Broadening the Criteria for Involuntary Ther-
apeutic Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 865, 879 n.53 (1988)
("Involuntary patients commonly are poor and unemployed. In our Washington
study, we found that over 90 percent of all committees were unemployed at the
time of their initial commitment.").
1092 [Vol. 36: p. 1085
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most of their assets or expectancies. In the 1970s and 1980s,
when discharged in increasing numbers, their economic and
placement needs, as well as a place to live, were well beyond what
was left of social service funding streams. Many either had no
family to return to or strongly preferred to live on their own.
Soon most lost their federal total disability payments, Social Se-
curity and other benefits. 46
The best community programs put in place (to remedy the
needs of discharged patients) were conducted in small residential
settings. Some of these programs have been excellent. Where
these resources are available, many chronically mentally ill have
made reasonably good adjustments, and their lives are far better
than they were in the state hospital. 47 However, there were few
such programs, and for most of the mentally ill, mere physical
survival often became a daily challenge.
As Robert Coates commented in Legal Rights of Homeless
Americans:
That homeless persons lack a support system and
face great difficulties in meeting basic subsistence needs
of food, shelter and clothing is axiomatic. A fortiori, the
Homeless who are mentally ill face the greatest difficul-
ties in meeting these basic subsistence needs. The appli-
cation processes to obtain resources to meet any of these
needs, even those for emergency shelter, are often so
complex and daunting that individuals with significant
mental impairment have no chance of successfully nego-
tiating these processes. 48
Aftercare upon discharge from the state hospital has always
been problematical. 49 The necessary coordination between state
46. Coates, supra note 13, at 331.
47. Briefing Paper, supra note 2, at 126.
The proper implementation of deinstitutionalization is clearly a solu-
tion.... [It] has two parts: patient must be discharged.., and contin-
ued support must be provided in the community .... [Tihere are
scores of model programs where chronically mentally ill live decently,
fit harmoniously into the community, and require comparatively little
public expense. It has been sadly noted that the problem is not that
deinstitutionalization failed, but that it is so rarely tried.
Id.
48. Coates, supra note 13, at 331 (footnote omitted). Returning to a hostile
environment after being deinstitutionalized caused further mental deterioration
in former state psychiatric patients. Id. at 332.
49. See HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL, supra note 11, at 99. The aftercare system
generally consists of stringent requirements with respect to attendance, sched-
1991] 1093
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facilities and community services has been lacking. In many
states, different governmental authorities are involved, and there
is no intermediary or supervising agency to double-check whether
an aftercare plan is being implemented. Anti-psychotic medica-
tion has unpleasant side effects and can be irreversibly debilitat-
ing.50 In medicated remission, many persons deny that they are
ill or in need of treatment. If a person decompensates, out-pa-
tient treatment or even recommitment to the hospital has been
difficult to enforce.
One of the effects of the clear and present danger commit-
ment standard was to increase the numbers of mentally ill persons
who wound up in corrections. 51 The jails and prisons began to
complain that they were being overloaded with "crazies." Mental
health advocates complained that mental illness was being
"criminalized." 52 State hospitals complained that their popula-
tions were being infiltrated by commitments of anti-social or soci-
opathic people, who were not mentally ill in the same sense as
their other patients.53
uled appointments, and adherence to rules of participants and behavior. Id.
Many homeless people are unable or unwilling to comply with such require-
ments. Id.
50. See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229 (1990) ("[antip-
sychotic drugs] can have serious, even fatal, side effects"); Rennie v. Klein, 720
F.2d 266, 275 (3d Cir. 1983) (Weis,J. concurring) ("long-term administration of
anti-psychotic drugs may result in permanent physical and mental impairment").
51. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095 (E.D. Wis. 1972), va-
cated on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D.
Wis. 1976). In this early, well-noted decision analogizing involuntary commit-
ment to deportation, the court held that the evidentiary burden must be beyond
a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1094-95. However, in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 432-33 (1979), the Supreme Court rejected the reasonable-doubt standard
and held that "determination of the precise burden equal to or greater than the
'clear and convincing' standard ... is a matter of state law." The Court "con-
cluded that the reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate in civil proceedings
because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis, it may impose a burden
the state cannot meet and thereby erect an unreasonable barrier to needed med-
ical treatment." Addington, 441 U.S. at 432; see The National Center for State Courts'
Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 409, 415 (1986) [hereinafter Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment] ("By
the mid-1970s, many states had enacted restrictive laws that contained narrow
commitment criteria and stringent legal safeguards. These laws made it more
difficult to commit persons deemed mentally ill and in need of treatment.").
52. See HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL, supra note 11, at 67-69; Kanter, supra note
10, at 92 ("Another result of deinstitutionalization has been the 'criminalization'
of a subgroup of individuals with mental illness.").
53. See Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 51, at 415-16.
Some observers came to believe that the legal safeguards against im-
proper commitment based on the criminal, due process model created
unnecessary barriers to the provision of treatment for seriously men-
tally ill persons .... [Another development was] 'transinstitutionaliza-
1094 [Vol. 36: p. 1085
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 5 [1991], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol36/iss5/4
MENTALLY ILL HOMELESS
Impressionistically at least, all of these observations were
correct.54 Under the revised standards, many discharged patients
could not be involuntarily re-institutionalized. If they were vio-
lent, they often would be incarcerated. If they were without food
or shelter, jail was, as always, a place of resort. With the emphasis
in the standard on harmful conduct, the hospitals began to re-
ceive individuals who were unlike the familiar withdrawn or some-
times frenzied long-term patient population. The arrival of
severe prison overcrowding in the 1980s meant that cells were
not as available for the mentally ill. Hospitals developed strate-
gies to be selective about patient intake.
The tragic dilemma that resulted from the mass discharge
and exodus of the chronically mentally ill can be likened to the
classic conflict between forms of personal freedom and control.
Lon Fuller posited two antithetical models or typologies of free-
dom. 55 Freedom can be thought of as the capacity to choose from
a large number of possibilities. 56 However, if the number is be-
wildering or without priority, or the possibilities are beyond
reach, the condition becomes chaos. A psychological manifesta-
tion of this phenomena is schizophrenia. Acute schizophrenics
must be helped to systemize some of the smallest tasks-putting
on socks, shoes, tying shoelaces, brushing teeth.
Or: Freedom can be regarded as order and regularity, the
freedom that comes from functioning within known limits or an
internalized structure-the freedom epitomized, in one sense, in
Prokofiev's "Classical Symphony." 57 Taken to the extreme, how-
ever, this form of freedom leads to rigidity, confinement and loss
of autonomy.
The civil rights aspects of deinstitutionalization were hu-
mane, well-intentioned, often clinically overdue and constitution-
ally necessary. Most former state hospital patients found that
tion' of mentally ill patients from mental hospitals to nursing homes,
temporary shelters, and jails with inadequate care.
Id.
54. See Ludwig, The Homeless, the Mentally Ill and the Law, PA. LAW., June
1989, at 27, 32. As the article suggests, there is an "element of truth" in the
positions of both the state hospitals and the jails. Id. For a discussion of these
positions, see supra text accompanying notes 51-53.
55. Fuller, Freedom-A Suggested Analysis, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1305-25 (1955).
For a discussion of these models or typologies of freedom, see infra text accom-
panying notes 56-57.
56. Fuller, supra note 55, at 1309. (" '[Fireedom to,' means the opportunity
to choose between alternatives or among a range of alternatives.").
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they preferred marginal living arrangements or even the street to
existence in the institution. Yet the problems and stresses of
mere survival without realistic economic or treatment supports
could not help but be extremely decompensating and harmful,
both mentally and physically. For these unfortunate people, free-
dom outside of the institution was transformed into a nightmarish
kind of self-imprisonment. Their plight demonstrates that free-
dom without power is not freedom. Given a world without struc-
ture or organization, an analogy may be made to florid
schizophrenia. 5
The social politics of the mentally ill homeless had a counter-
deinstitutionalizing effect. The constant visibility of the homeless
produced waves of complaints stirred by feelings of fear, anger,
resentment and sometimes guilt.5 9 The efforts of legislative and
executive policymakers to respond to this problem have gener-
ated a new set of issues involving the individual's interest in lib-
erty versus the state's interest in protecting its citizens. 60 As to
the mentally ill, it has prompted a re-examination of commitment
standards, the question of the right to treatment and to refuse
treatment, the legal status and entitlement of a deinstitutionalized
person and the nature and extent of the services that the local,
state or federal government may be obligated to provide.
The subset of the dangerousness to oneself standard-the in-
ability to care for oneself-has produced little case law. Mentally
ill homeless are rarely committable as dangerous to others. 6 1 In
retrospect, the unable-to-care for oneself standards of the 1970s
were not drafted with the mentally ill homeless in mind. Instead,
they were intended for the psychotic who did not recognize any-
58. See R. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE 79 (1967).
59. Note, supra note 31, at 363 ("[M]edical professionals [may] condone
commitment because they see few alternatives to the public's fears of the men-
tally ill and homeless .... The media may perpetuate such prejudices which
effectively blame these individuals for their condition.") (footnotes omitted); see
also A First Look at Homeless is Raw Sight for Tourist, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1987, at
B I, col. 5 (article describes "bloated women with ulcerated legs and hollow-eyed
men who shout obscenities" living on New York City streets).
60. See Kanter, supra note 10, at 92 ("Two issues have emerged .... First,
whether homeless people should be institutionalized against their will .... A
second issue concerns forced treatment and sheltering.").
61. See Coates, supra note 13, at 344 ("As a Municipal Court judge . .. I
have seen hundreds of homeless individuals .... Very rarely is a theft case seen;
and I have been surprised, frankly, at the almost total dearth of Homeless de-
fendants being charged with felonies."); see also Durham & La Fond, supra note
20, at 307 n.10 ("[M]ore recent research indicates that the mentally ill are no
more dangerous than the non-mentally ill. Media reporting, however, seems to
contribute to the public's perception that the mentally ill are more dangerous.").
1096
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one or for the family member whom no one wanted to care for or
put up with any longer.62
II. THE GREENING OF FORENSIC MENTAL HEALTH
In the period predating the dramatic rise in homelessness,
developments occurred in the use of mental health expert testi-
mony that would have a future impact on the commitment of the
mentally ill homeless. By the 1960s, the legal and mental health
professions had begun, though not always happily, to join forces
in a large variety of civil and criminal areas. In 1965, Dr. Leigh
Roberts wrote: "The professions of law and psychiatry currently
interact with greater intensity and frequency than at any prior
point in time." 63 Psychiatrists were called upon to testify in court
as to "mental illness," "mental disorder," and "mental disease or
defect" as they related to various legal states, such as insanity,
dangerousness or incompetence.64 The theory was that mental
impairment is relevant because it can blunt a person's perception
and awareness or make it difficult to control one's conduct. As to
propensities for harmful behavior and incompetency, the law may
ask whether, in a particular case, these conditions are susceptible
to improvement or deterioration. Are they treatable? Answers to
these question usually require expertise. 65 In making an evalua-
tion, mental health experts utilize diagnostic categories, which are
a part of their esoteric fields of knowledge. They construct hy-
potheses about future behavior and amenability to treatment. To
aid the factfinder in the courtroom, their testimony necessitates a
62. See Ludwig, supra note 54, at 30 (unable-to-care for oneself standard of
Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976 "almost sounds as though it
was written specifically with the mentally ill homeless in mind"). Id. Professor
Brooks refers to "a new legal category of mentally ill persons ...which has
generally been described by use of the term 'gravely disabled' ..... They can be
regarded as dangerous to themselves due to their inability to attend to their
critical life functions." Brooks, Defining the Dangerousness of the Mentally Ill: Invol-
untary Civil Commitment, in MENTALLY ABNORMAL OFFENDERS 280, 298 (M. Craft &
A. Craft eds. 1984).
63. Roberts, Some Observations on the Problem of the Forensic Psychiatrist, 1965
Wis. L. REV. 240.
64. R. REISNER & C. SLOBOGIN, LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 327-
29, 376-490 (1990). The history and analysis in this section are largely adapted
from Professor Slobogin's pre-publication class materials, some of which were
incorporated in the textbook.
65. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's views on expert psychiatric
testimony, see infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text. See also Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979) ("The [clinical] facts ... must be interpreted by
expert psychiatrists and psychologists .... ); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 80
(1985) ("Psychiatrists can translate a medical diagnosis into language that will
assist the trier of fact.").
1991] 1097
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legally sufficient degree of certainty and often involves the use of
predictions. 66
Critics emerged and attacked the reliability of mental health
expert testimony from many sides. 67 Radical psychiatrists con-
tended that mental illness is not the same as physical illness be-
cause mental illness is not objectively measurable and cannot be
scientifically validated. 68 In 1970, Thomas Szasz wrote: "My aim
... is to ask if there is such a thing as mental illness, and to argue
that there is not. Of course, mental illness is not a thing or physi-
cal object; hence it can exist only in the same sort of way as do
other theoretical concepts." 69 In 1967, R.D. Laing asserted, per-
haps prophetically, that "those who are diagnosed as schizo-
phrenic are not ill but are reacting in a sane and rational way to
the intolerable emotional pressures placed on them by society
and their families."' 70 "Without exception," he continued, "what is
labelled schizophrenic is a special strategy that a person invents in order
to live in an unlivable situation."'7 1 In the same year, Dr. Sarbin
stated that "[p]ersons who are labeled mentally ill are not re-
garded as merely sick; they are regarded as a special class of be-
ings, to be feared or scorned, sometimes to be pitied, but nearly
always to be degraded." 72 Goffman had documented the effect of
institutionalization on the lives of mental patients, who may even-
tually view themselves as incapable of living regular lives outside
the institution. 73
66. See R. REISNER & C. SLOBOGIN, supra note 64, at 376-443. The admissi-
bility of clinical opinion testimony is discussed in terms of "normality," "respon-
sibility," "propensity," and "competency"-which can be redefined as
diagnoses that relate to past and future conduct and present capability. Id. at
378. Predictive testimony is considered under propensity. Id. at 417.
67. Id. at 350-75.
68. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health
Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 607 (1978). "Unlike much physical disorder that
often can be verified by various tests that measure pathology . there is no
objective, empirical referent of mental disorder other than crazy behavior itself."
Id.
69. T. SZASZ, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY 12 (1970). But see M. MOORE, LAW
AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 156 (1984) ("The problem is
that mental illness is not a myth. It is not some palpable falsehood propagated
among the populace by power-mad psychiatrists, as Szasz ... has proclaimed; it
is a cruel and bitter reality that has been with the human race since antiquity.").
70. See R. LAING, supra note 58, at 78-79.
71. Id.
72. Sarbin, On the Futility of the Proposition that Some People Be Labeled "Mentally
Ill," 31J. CONSULTING PSYCHOLOGY 447, 451 (1967). There are also "beliefs that
such 'mentally ill' persons discharge obligations only of the most simple kinds."
Id.
73. E. GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL
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Civil rights lawyers questioned the trustworthiness of psychi-
atric testimony. In 1974, commentators Bruce Ennis and Thomas
Litwack published Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom.74 They described the experiences of eight
pseudo-patients, persons who feigned hearing voices and were
kept in a mental hospital from seven to fifty-two days. 75 All but
one was diagnosed as schizophrenic. 76 Psychiatrists, they argued,
were trained to suspect illness and were strongly biased by their
personal value systems. 77 Each school of psychiatry has a differ-
ent view of mental illness and how it should be treated. In 1978,
Professor Morse proposed that mental health expert testimony
should be limited to descriptions of the cognitive and affective
states of an individual. 78 The reason is that "unrestricted testi-
mony tends to obscure the moral and social nature of the ques-
tions being asked. ' ' 79 It can be "really a moral guess and not a
PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES (1961). In his discussion of institutionalization,
Erving Goffman stated:
[Tiotal institutions disrupt or defile precisely those actions that in civil
society have the role of attesting to the actor and those in his presence
that he has some command over his world-that he is a person with
"adult" self-determination, autonomy, and freedom of action. A failure
to retain this kind of adult executive competency, or at least the sym-
bols of it, can produce in the inmate the terror of feeling radically de-
moted in the age-grading system.
Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).
74. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974).
75. Id. at 730.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 720-29. The authors point out that the "assumption that an indi-
vidual diagnosed as schizophrenic requires involuntary care and treatment often
may be erroneous." Id. at 732. They base this conclusion on "a significant am-
biguity" present in "the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion-which presumably provides the basis for psychiatric diagnoses." Id.
Apparently, the manual provides that patients should be diagnosed as psychotic
only if their "mental functioning is sufficiently impaired to interfere grossly with
their capacity to meet the ordinary demands of life." Id. (quoting AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DSM-II: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 23 (2d ed. 1968)). The authors suggest that, under that defi-
nition, almost anyone diagnosed as psychotic would necessarily satisfy the crite-
ria for involuntary commitment. Id. at 732. The manual provides that patients
may be diagnosed as schizophrenic, a sub-category of psychosis, "even if the
individuals 'are not in fact psychotic.' " Id. The problem is that many psychia-
trists believe that "millions of persons who could be diagnosed as schizophrenic
do not require hospitalization." Id. Therefore, the authors conclude "the use of
diagnoses such as schizophrenia is misleading and can prejudice the prospective
patient's rights." Id.
78. Morse, supra note 68, at 619. Professor Morse suggested that experts
should refrain from drawing conclusions and instead provide "descriptive data
that would otherwise be unknown and hard, relevant probability data." Id.
79. Id. at 626. Professor Morse contended that using experts in an un-
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scientific fact," he wrote.8 0 From an evidentiary perspective, it
exceeds the limits of a mental professional's sphere of
expertise."'
In 1967, in an appendix to Washington v. United States,8 2 Judge
Bazelon recommended that the mental health expert concentrate
on descriptive testimony, although diagnoses were a convenient
method of communication and should not be eliminated.83 A
number of Supreme Court Justices-for example, Frankfurter,
Burger and Thurgood Marshall-have written on the incertitude
of mental health clinician testimony.8 4 In the aftermath of the
Hinckley case, Congress amended the Federal Rules of Evidence
to bar expert evidence as to a defendant's mental state or condi-
tion constituting an element or defense in a criminal case.8 5 Dr.
Alan Stone, past president of the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion (A.P.A.), explained the psychiatrists' debate concerning
restricted manner fosters the misconception that the questions being asked are
predominantly scientific. Id.
80. Id. at 619. Professor Morse stated that "there are no scientific tests to
measure the strength of crazy urges or the strength of the [individual's] self-
control." Id. at 618.
81. Id. at 626. Professor Morse noted that the expert testimony of mental
health professionals often can be inefficient, wasteful and prejudicial. Id.
82. 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
83. Id. at 457. Judge Bazelon stated that an expert witness may testify as to
"whether the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect.... [and] how
defendant's disease or defect relates to his alleged offense, that is, how the de-
velopment, adaptation and functioning of defendant's behavioral processes may
have influenced his conduct." Id. Judge Bazelon also noted that the expert's
description must be complete in order to allow the jury to make an informed
judgment as to whether the alleged crime was a result of the defendant's mental
disease or defect. Id.
84. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 81 (1985) (Marshall, J.) ("Psy-
chiatry is not ...an exact science, and psychiatrists disagree widely and fre-
quently on what constitutes mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be
attached to given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on likeli-
hood of future dangerousness."); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 579
(1975) (Burger, C.J. concurring) ("The Court appropriately takes notice of the
uncertainties of psychiatric diagnosis and therapy."); Greenwood v. United
States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956) (Frankfurter, J.) ("The only certain thing that
can be said about the present state of knowledge and therapy regarding mental
disease is that science has not reached finality of judgment.").
85. FED. R. EvID. 704(b):
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condi-
tion of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference
as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or
condition constituting an element of the crime charged or a defense
thereto.
Id. As originally enacted in 1975, Rule 704 eliminated the ultimate issue limita-
tion on expert testimony. The Hinkley case amendment is the sole exception to
the liberalized rule.
1100 [Vol. 36: p. 1085
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Hinckley as an honest disagreement over the classification of a
disorder under the A.P.A.'s then-current diagnostic manual.8 6
Hinckley's condition fell into a gray area between psychosis, a se-
verely impairing illness, and a personality disorder, which is usu-
ally not thought of as a basis for nonresponsibility. Much has also
been written about "criterion variance" as the cause of disputes
among mental health experts.8 7
By the 1970s, the new commitment laws reduced the power
of the psychiatrist to control the process. Commitments were no
longer medical and administrative in nature, but became judicial
proceedings with counseled hearings and, in some instances, jury
trials.88 In 1974, the California Supreme Court decided in
Tarasoff v. Board of Regents of University of California"9 that a mental
health professional was vulnerable to personal liability based on a
newly articulated duty of the therapist to protect and warn others
of potential harm.90 By the 1980s, many influential psychiatrists
came to the conclusion that they should not be asked to testify as
to legal states and, in particular, that they should not be required
to predict future dangerousness. 9' The reason given was that
they could not reliably make such predictions.9 2
In 1981, Dr. John Monahan, in The Clinical Prediction of Violent
Behavior,93 wrote: "[T]he 'best' clinical research currently in
86. A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND MORALITY: ESSAYS AND ANALYSIS 92-93
(1984).
87. See Morse, supra note 68, at 608-12. Morse defines criterion variance as
the "differences resulting from the imprecision of the diagnostic categories." Id.
at 608.
88. See Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note 51, at 415
("[T]he plight of mental patients became a civil rights issue.., and restrictions
were placed on the discretionary authority of mental health professionals and
family members to commit mentally ill persons indefinitely to large, state-run
institutions."). Jury trials are now permitted in a few states. See, e.g., CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 5302 (West 1984).
89. 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974), reh'ggranted,
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
90. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 440, 551 P.2d at 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26. In
reaching this decision, the court weighed the interest in protecting the confiden-
tiality of psychotherapeutic information against the public interest in safety from
potential violence by patients. Id.
91. See, e.g., Robitscher & Williams, Should Psychiatrists Get Out of the Court-
room?, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Dec. 1977, at 85, 140. ("Obviously not.... The real
problem is to make forensic psychiatrists more responsible . . .so that judges
and juries get less confusing advice.").
92. Id. at 86. ("Many psychiatrists ... oppose the expansion of forensic
psychiatry, particularly in the courtroom. They are embarrassed by stark con-
flicts in psychiatric testimony that, they fear, undermine the credibility of the
profession as a whole.").
93. J. MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981).
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existence indicates that psychiatrists and psychologists are accu-
rate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent be-
havior over a year period among institutionalized populations
that had both committed violence in the past and who were diag-
nosed as mentally ill." 94
The American Bar Association Criminal Mental Health Stan-
dards, which were the work of six interdisciplinary task forces
with seventy-nine nationally recognized experts in law and mental
health, formulated the following: "An expert opinion stating a
conclusion that a particular person will or will not engage in dan-
gerous behavior in the future should not be admissible in any
criminal proceeding or in any special commitment hearing involv-
ing a person found not responsible under the criminal law." 95
While the commentary acknowledged that most mental health ex-
pert testimony, characterized as "informed speculation," could be
helpful to the trier of fact, predictive speculation could not be
helpful because it is not within the "specialized knowledge" of the
expert.96 Specialized knowledge is the expert qualification
threshold of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 97
In 1983, the six-member majority of the United States
Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle,98 did not share these restric-
tive views. Thejury had returned a death sentence with a specific
finding that there was a probability defendant would commit fur-
ther acts of violence and represented a continuing threat to soci-
ety.99 Under the Texas statute, this was a death penalty
prerequisite. 00 The prosecution's case included the testimony of
94. Id. at 470-49 (emphasis omitted).
95. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-3.9(b)
(1989). A distinction is made between past and present mental condition and
future mental condition and behavior. Id. at 7-3.9(a)-(b). Standard 7-3.9(a) ap-
proves of expert testimony as to past or present issues, provided the witness
expresses no "opinion on any question requiring a conclusion of law or a moral
or social value judgment" Id. at 7-3.9(a).
96. Id., Standard 7-3.9, Commentary at 119. See Slobogin, The Role of
Mental Health Professionals in the Criminal Process: The Case for Informed Speculation,
66 VA. L. REV. 427, 432-34 & nn.9-10(1980) (critiquing of subjectivism in crimi-
nal law and distinguishing between "moral skeptics" and "method skeptics").
Professor Morse is characterized as a "moral skeptic." Id. at 434 & n.9. For a
discussion of Professor Morse's position, see supra note 68 and accompanying
text. Another commentator, Professor Morris, is referred to as an example of a
"method skeptic." Slobogin, supra at 433 & n.10; see Morris, Psychiatry and The
Dangerous Criminal, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 514, 533 (1968).
97. FED. R. EvID. 702. ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact .
98. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
99. Id. at 884.
100. Id. at 916. For the state to obtain a death sentence in Texas, it must
[Vol. 36: p. 10851102
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two psychiatrists, neither of whom had evaluated defendant.' 10
In response to hypothetical questions, both gave the opinion that
defendant was a criminal sociopath, that no treatment could
change his condition, and, according to one of them, on a ten-
scale of sociopathic severity, defendant was "above 10."102
On appeal, defendant claimed that such use of psychiatric
testimony "was unconstitutional because psychiatrists, individu-
ally and as a class, are not competent to predict future dangerous-
ness."' 103 In affirming, Justice White answered this contention
with the prickly observation: "The suggestion that no psychia-
trist's testimony may be presented with respect to a defendant's
future dangerousness is somewhat like asking us to disinvent the
wheel." 104
Seven years before, inJurek v. Texas,' 0 5 the Supreme Court
had held that the likelihood of future violence was a constitution-
ally acceptable standard for imposing the death penalty.' 0 6 In
that case, no expert testimony had been presented. 107 Therefore,
if laypersons were able to make such a finding unaided by an ex-
pert, it made little sense to argue in Barefoot that a psychiatrist
should not be permitted to testify.
On this issue, Barefoot looked to Addington v. Texas, 10 8 a 1979
decision that considered the nature of the involuntary commit-
ment process. The Addington Court had opined: "Whether the
individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others
and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the
"prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 'there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society.' " Id.
101. Id. at 917. Both psychiatrists were qualified as expert witnesses. Id.
102. 463 U.S. 918-19. The psychiatrists were questioned by defense coun-
sel as to the "inherent unreliability" of psychiatric predictions of a person's fu-
ture violent behavior. Id. at 919. Both denied such unreliability. Id.
103. Id. at 884-85. More specifically, defendant argued that the psychia-
trists' predictions would likely result in the imposition of erroneous sentences.
Id. at 835. Therefore, he argued that their use violated the eighth and four-
teenth amendments. Id.
104. Id. at 896. The Court stated that "[w]e are unconvinced ... that the
adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable
evidence and opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when the con-
victed felon has the opportunity to present his own side of the case." Id. at 901.
105. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
106. Id. at 272-76; see also Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). The Smith
Court noted that the state may use evidence with respect to a defendant's past
criminal conduct to establish "defendant's propensity to commit other violent
acts." Id. at 473.
107. Id.
108. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psy-
chologists."' 0 9 Responding to the amicus brief of the American
Psychiatric Association, which emphasized the vagaries of assess-
ing future conduct and cited the Monahan study, the Barefoot
Court stated: "We are not persuaded that such testimony is al-
most entirely unreliable and that the fact finder and the adversary
system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due
account of its shortcomings." ' "10 Counsel for Thomas Barefoot,
however, had not presented any evidence challenging the meth-
odology of the prosecution's psychiatrists. Also, a substantive re-
buttal expert, if not an improbable witness, would have serious
credibility deficits. Justice Blackmun's caustic dissent noted that
"[n]o reputable expert would be able to predict with confidence
that the defendant will not be violent ....
III. THE JOYCE BROWN CASE: HOMELESSNESS AND
COMMITrABILITY
In the case of Joyce Brown, the trial judge, as the factfinder,
concluded that the psychiatric testimony was unhelpful.12 Seven
psychiatrists testified, four of whom were called by the hospital
and three by petitioner." 3 The hospital psychiatrists stated that
Brown suffered from schizophrenia, paranoid type, and that she
was delusional, incapable of insight, incompetent to make deci-
sions, and unable to take care of herself.' 14 On the other hand,
petitioner's psychiatrists, who evaluated her after she was hospi-
talized and medicated, testified that in their opinion she was not
109. Id. at 429 (emphasis supplied by the Court).
110. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 899. The Court pointed out that some psychia-
trists are willing to testify concerning the likelihood of a defendant's future dan-
gerousness and claim to be knowledgeable on the subject. Id. The Court also
noted that there are psychiatrists who "expressly disagree with the Association's
point of view." Id.
111. Id. at 934 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun expressed con-
cern over an erroneous death verdict resulting from allowing psychiatrists to
predict a defendant's propensity for future violence. Id. at 935.
112. See In re Boggs, 136 Misc. 2d 1082, 1089, 522 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (Sup.
Ct.) rev'd sub nom. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d
340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), appeal dismissed as moot, 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d
515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988). Judge Lippmann, the trial judge, stated: "Con-
sidering all the evidence and the contradictory expert psychiatric opinions of-
fered, I find the proof neither clear nor convincing on the question of [Brown's]
mental state." Id.
113. Id. at 1084, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
114. Id. The hospital psychiatrist concluded that Brown should continue to
be hospitalized because her mental condition would deteriorate rapidly if she
returned to the streets. Id.
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psychotic.' 1 5 The rest of their assessments were also diametri-
cally opposed to those of the hospital psychiatrists." 16
The trial judge's opinion states that because of the sharp dis-
agreement in the psychiatric testimony, great weight had to be
given to the demeanor and testimony of Joyce Brown herself in
evaluating her behavior as a homeless person."t 7 Recounting that
testimony in detail, the opinion describes the issue as whether,
under New York's Mental Hygiene Law, Brown had a mental ill-
ness likely to result in serious harm to herself or others, the bur-
den of persuasion being on the hospital by clear and convincing
evidence." 8 As to mental illness, the trial judge found the evi-
dence to be insufficient.' 1 9 But further, even assuming that she
were mentally ill, the likelihood of serious harm had not been es-
tablished. There was no evidence that she was suicidal.' 20 Addi-
tionally, the trial judge concluded that she was able to meet the
essential needs of food and clothing.121
As to shelter, the eloquent opinion in Boggs bears repeating:
Can Joyce Brown provide herself with shelter?
Housing in New York is an expensive commodity, so ex-
pensive that in this rich city many no longer can afford it
and are driven to live on the street. Who among us is
not familiar with the tattered, filthy, malodorous pres-
ence of the wretched homeless? The tired, poor, hud-
dled masses need no longer be invited to our shores.
Our society has created them at home. The blame and
shame must attach to us, not to them. The predicament
115. Id. at 1085-86, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 409. One of petitioner's psychiatrists,
for instance, found her logical, coherent and able to know right from wrong. Id.
at 1085, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
116. Id. at 1085-86, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 409. For a discussion of the hospital
psychiatrists' assessments of Brown's condition, see supra notes 4-8 and accom-
panying text.
117. Id. at 1086, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
118. Id. at 1088, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 411. "[I]f the patient has a mental illness
which is likely to result in serious harm to herself or others," the patient may be
involuntarily retained under the New York statute. Id.
119. Id. at 1089, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
120. Id. at 1089, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412. The Court found all seven psychia-
trists to be in agreement that her tests did not show "suicidal ideation," and
there was no evidence to support a finding that she would likely cause harm to
herself or others. Id.
121. Id. at 1091, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412. "In addition to the statutory defini-
tion, decisional law holds the likelihood of serious harm exists where mental
illness results in the refusal or inability to meet essential needs for food, clothing
and shelter." Id. at 1091, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
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of Joyce Brown and the countless homeless raises ques-
tions of broad social, economic, political and moral im-
plications not within the purview of this court.' 22
Then, noting that she was physically well, despite living on the
street for a year, the opinion continued:
But how can anyone living in security and comfort even
begin to imagine what is required to survive on the
street? It cannot be reasoned that because Joyce Brown
is homeless she is mentally ill. What must be proved is
that because she is mentally ill she is incapable of provid-
ing herself with food, clothing and shelter. Yet, though
homeless, she copes, she is fit, she survives.
She refuses to be housed in a shelter. That may re-
veal more about conditions in shelters than about Joyce
Brown's mental state. It might, in fact, prove that she's
quite sane. She refuses confinement in Bellevue's psy-
chiatric facilities, preferring freedom on the street with
all its attendant risks.
... There must be some civilized alternatives other
than involuntary hospitalization or the street. 2 3
In reversing, the appellate division rejected the trial court's
findings as against the weight of the evidence, in particular, in
crediting petitioner's testimony over the hospital experts' testi-
mony. 124 The three-judge majority reviewed the evidence of
Joyce Brown's year on the street and her psychiatric history,
which included hospitalization for mental illness two years before
with large dosages of Thorazine for acute psychosis.' 25 During
the year, she had been observed on the sidewalk at 65th Street
and 2nd Avenue almost daily by a clinical team of city psychia-
trists, nurses, and social workers known as Project HELP. Ac-
cording to Project HELP witnesses, she urinated and defecated
on the sidewalk, was unclean, disheveled, tore up dollar bills,
threw things, cursed and shouted obscenities, flashed her but-
122. Id. at 1090, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412.
123. Id. at 1090-91, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 412-13.
124. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 361-
62, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71, 84 (1987) appeal dismissed as moot, 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520
N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988). The majority concluded that "we must
make our own findings of fact, since there is no fair interpretation of the evi-
dence that can support the fact findings of the Hearing Court, and we reject
these findings." Id.
125. Id. at 358-60, 362-63, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 82-83, 85.
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tocks, spoke in sexual rhymes, twirled an open umbrella although
it was not raining, screamed racial epithets at delivery men and
accused them of thinking she was a prostitute. She slept on a hot-
air vent. On one occasion she was seen running into moving traf-
fic. She also became increasingly hostile to the Project HELP
team.
In discussing the testimony of Brown's three psychiatrists,
the appellate majority emphasized that these doctors had not ob-
served her outside of the hospital, noting that the hospital, unlike
the street, is a structured, safe environment and that a mentally ill
person can go through a period of remission in the hospital. 126 It
was not surprising that Joyce Brown's testimony was rational, co-
herent and intelligent because by then she had received a week of
hospital treatment. Until 1985, Joyce Brown had been a produc-
tive member of society for almost a decade. She worked for Bell
Laboratories and a human rights agency in New Jersey. In the
majority's view, having suffered a severe psychosis, she deterio-
rated to the point where she lived on the street. The need for her
continued hospitalization was shown because she was in danger
of doing serious harm to herself.
The dissent found Brown to be mentally ill but viewed the
self-danger issue as one of lifestyle.' 27 It stressed that in her year
on the street she had not harmed herself or anyone else.' 28
TheJoyce Brown case was utilized by the New York Civil Lib-
erties Union to challenge Mayor Edward Koch's decision in 1987
to reduce, by executive directive, the state involuntary commit-
ment standard.' 2 9 The mayor ordered Project HELP to take in
persons who might be dangerous in "the reasonable foreseeable
future."' 30 The constitutionality of the foreseeable future stan-
dard has been disputed as vague and overbroad. It was rejected
by the New York Legislature six times in the 1980s.13 1
126. Id. at 355, 365, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 80, 86.
127. See id. at 377, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 93-94 (Milonas, J., dissenting) ("We
cannot accept the majority's total disregard for the fact finding of the hearing
court.... [I]f the court's judgment .. .is to be completely ignored, then what
was the purpose of the hearing in the first place?").
128. Id. at 378, 523 N.Y.S.2d at 94 (Milonas, J., dissenting). The court
stated that her "conduct on the street is understandable if we appreciate her
obvious pride in her independence and in her ability to survive on her own." Id.
(Milonas, J., dissenting).
129. Note, supra note 31, at 340. The Mayor's policy consisted of involun-
tarily committing homeless people who appeared to be unable to care for them-
selves. Id. Temperature was not a factor. Id.
130. Id. at 340-41.
131. Id. at 341-42.
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It can be argued that anyone living on the streets is in con-
stant danger of violence, theft, cold and hunger. 3 2 Moreover,
the definition of foreseeable danger to oneself may include both
physical and mental well-being, which is, arguably, overbroad and
circuitous. By comparison, the Pennsylvania statute restricts self-
danger to physical debilitation within a time-frame of thirty
days. 133 This is an imminent danger standard, which eliminates
psychological deterioration as a basis for commitment. In this
way, intervention is permissible only if the potential harm would
clearly cause objectively demonstrable injury.
Where does eccentricity and bizarre behavior end and com-
mittable mental disorder begin? In the early 1970s, a number of
psychiatrists in Pennsylvania wanted to include in the commit-
ment standard a manic behavior provision, said to apply to mid-
dle-aged, affluent men. ' 3 4 These men suddenly left their families,
let their hair grow long, dressed outlandishly and began spending
money in uninhibited ways. Psychiatrists said that this often rep-
resented a form of hypomania and the person could be brought
to his senses with a short period of force treatment. The legisla-
ture, a group predominantly of middle-aged men, was not moved
to make that behavior committable.
Project HELP originally was intended to save homeless per-
sons from freezing to death.' 3 5 Gradually, the state standard was
modified by the city's executive order to permit mentally ill home-
less to be detained regardless of the temperature. The policy, an-
nounced in 1987, was to detain what were termed "gravely
disabled" people-those foreseeably at risk-but this proved to
be self-defeating.' 36 The homeless were taken to emergency
rooms and kept there as long as five days because there was no
bed space. The mental health wards were already full. Eventu-
ally, the mayor was convinced to give up the idea when advised
that it was creating a special class of emergency commitments.
Also, the New York Civil Liberties Union, in 1988, filed a class
action claiming that nine named plaintiffs had been held in emer-
gency rooms for days strapped to stretchers or handcuffed to
132. Id. at 341.
133. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7301(b)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1991).
134. In 1974, this proposal was made by a committee of the Pennsylvania
Psychiatric Society to Senator Coppersmith, chair of the Pennsylvania Senate
Health and Welfare Committee, which was considering a bill that, in 1976, be-
came Pennsylvania's new commitment law.
135. Note, supra note 31, at 340-41.
136. Id. at 340.
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wheelchairs under crowded, foul conditions. 13 7
The Project HELP approach, to the extent that it deals with
life-saving emergencies, is commendable. However, in emer-
gency cases there is a common law power to act without the need
for tinkering with the commitment standard, and existing com-
mitment laws usually allow such intervention. 38 Moreover, as a
remedy for dealing with the mentally ill homeless, Project HELP
is a gesture, not a solution. Long-term re-institutionalization is so
expensive that it will never again receive serious consideration,
and in many instances it is unnecessary and inappropriate.' 39
The demonstrated effectiveness of anti-psychotic medication
makes it possible for large numbers of mental patients, with
proper service support, to live in the community. 40
If a person is involuntarily committable, it would seem to fol-
low that upon discharge, usually in medicated remission, other-
wise unavailable living arrangements and services should be
provided to preserve that condition.14' If not, the course of de-
compensation is highly likely and is a reasonably certain predic-
tion that requires no expertise to make. This is similar to the
habilitation or preservation of skills thesis recognized in Youngberg
v. Romeo.' 42 That argument, however, has not been constitution-
ally applied to the mentally ill. Indeed, as to the mentally ill, no
federal right to treatment theories have been upheld. 43 Least re-
strictive alternative and right to treatment contentions have been
rejected. 144 As a result, advocacy cases are proceeding under
137. See Lizotte v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No. 85 Civ. 7548
(S.D.N.Y. May 8, 1990); see also Lizotte v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,
No. 85 Civ. 7548 (S.D.N.Y. March 13, 1990).
138. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 654 (1st Cir. 1980). "Given
these circumstances, the state asserts primarily its police power and its parens
patriae power as justification for the forcible administration of antipsychotic
drugs to those individuals who are in state run hospitals as a result of mental
illness." Id.
139. Kanter, supra note 10, at 92 ("[S]ome critics now see an easy response
... [-]return homeless or troublesome mentally ill people to state hospitals.
Yet such proposals are simplistic at best, and at worst, profoundly dangerous.").
140. See Durham & La Fond, supra note 20, at 344-45.
141. See Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 98 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J., concur-
ring) (released patient may have right to obtain care in community); see also Note,
supra note 39, at 1153-55 (contending that inadequate discharge planning and
lack of community resources violates fundamental tort principles).
142. 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982) (liberty interests require state to provide
minimal training).
143. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's consideration of this issue,
see supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1983) (court re-
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state law. 145 Many states have statutes providing for a right to
adequate treatment in the least restrictive setting as well as sup-
port for the indigent.' 46 However, courts are reluctant to order
the legislature or executive to make funding allocations.' 47 The
greatest long-range hope lies in building a constituency of deter-
mined citizenry.
Perhaps the disagreement between the two groups of psychi-
atrists in theJoyce Brown case is instructive. While some partisan
bias may have been present, all of these expert witnesses ap-
peared to have impressive credentials and, as Dr. Alan Stone said
of the Hinckley psychiatrists, in "honest disagreement."' 48 In
Hinckley, the disagreement may have been attributable to the diffi-
culty in diagnostic classification and criterion variance. But as to
Joyce Brown, the critical margin may have been the timing of the
evaluations: one set at or before admission to the hospital and
the other following hospitalization and anti-psychotic treat-
ment. 149 Otherwise, the disagreement over psychosis versus no-
psychosis is incongruous and difficult to explain. Can it be writ-
jected "least intrusive means" analysis and held involuntarily committed men-
tally ill patients have "constitutional right to refuse anti-psychotic drugs").
145. See Note, supra note 39, at 1167-72.
146. Id. at 1154.
The possibility of pursuing legal remedies has been effectively
foreclosed at the federal level .... [T]he Supreme Court's recent,
unanimous decision in Youngberg ... recognized only minimal rights of
mentally disabled persons under the federal constitution. As a result,
state courts and legislatures have now become the principal fora for
determining the rights of the mentally ill.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Durham & LaFond, supra note 20, at 318 ("[E]ven
if Constitutional analysis did not generate a right to treatment, most states have
conferred it as a matter of state statutory law.").
147. See Coates, supra note 13, at 340 ("Courts are traditionally disinclined
to impose affirmative mandates on local governments where enforcement will
unduly burden the courts, or prove impossible.").
148. For a discussion of Dr. Stone's explanation of the psychiatrists' de-
bate, see supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
149. For a discussion of Ms. Bogg's psychiatric reports, see supra notes 4-8
and accompanying text. The trial judge in Boggs also conjectured that
"[p]erhaps the disparity [in the diagnoses of the psychiatrists] results from the
lapse of time between examinations by the two groups." In re Boggs, 136 Misc.
2d 1082, 1088, 522 N.Y.S.2d 407, 411 (Sup. Ct.) rev'd sub nom. Boggs v. New
York City Heath & Hosps. Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340, 523 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1987), ap-
peal dismissed as moot, 70 N.Y.2d 972, 520 N.E.2d 515, 525 N.Y.S.2d 796 (1988).
In the Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment, it was noted that: "Conflicting
interests ... are at stake in regard to the issue of mental health treatment ...
before full judicial review." Guidelines for Involuntary Civil Commitment, supra note
51, at 37-38. It further notes that "a respondent who is medicated will fre-
quently make a better appearance before the hearing officer . . .and will not
display gross symptoms of psychosis that influence decision to commit." Id. at
38 n.2.
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ten off merely as the reflection of two different occupational out-
looks-as between hospital and community psychiatrists? Or, is it
evidence that supports the theorizing of R.D. Laing and others-
as to the plasticity of schizophrenia and its symptoms?
It is well known, as the appellate division majority observed,
that many schizophrenics are able to do reasonably well in a struc-
tured setting, whether it is a family, a group home, a school or an
institution. This is particularly so if treatment services are readily
obtainable.
IV. A RESPONSE FOR THE MENTALLY ILL HOMELESS:
THERAPEUTIC FAMILIES
The mentally ill homeless, metaphorically, have traveled a
long and calamitous road. 150 Many have left or been rejected by
their families, institutionalized for long-term custodial care in
state hospitals, discharged to a generally unsupportive, unrecep-
tive community and regarded on the street, not as people, but as
objects to be avoided. What is needed are therapeutic families,
small groups and clustered single-living arrangements with
boarding-house types of facilities-a place that the residents can
feel is home. From a legal, psychological and economic stand-
point, individually and societally, this is the best approach to
resolving the difficult and troubling issues of the mentally ill
homeless. 15'
150. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 13 (R. Fitzgerald trans. 1961). "Sing in me,
Muse, and through me tell the story of that man skilled in all ways of contending,
the wanderer, harried for years on end ...... Id.; see also Nocera, The Long,
Lonesome Road, 14 TEX. MONTHLY 43-53 (Nov. 1986).
151. See Durham & La Fond, supra note 20, at 368 (arguing against involun-
tary hospitalization: "[C]onstitutional theory, state legislation, and informed
public policy require public mental health systems . . . to concentrate . . . on
creating a system of community-based facilities that can provide ... care, treat-
ment, and social support.") (footnotes omitted).
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